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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 20000011-CA 
v. : 
WILLIAM D. TYREE : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for absconding, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309.5 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court violate criminal rule 22(a)'s requirement that the court "shall 
set a time for imposing sentence" not more than 45 days after entry of the guilty plea, 
and if so, is that time period jurisdictional? 
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v. 
Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, HI 1,388 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (citing State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 
151 (Utah App. 1997)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of this case requires interpretation of the following provisions: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (1995). 
Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court 
shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall not be less than two nor 
more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders.... 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-22(a) (1982). 
Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court 
shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor 
more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-1 (1976). 
After a plea or verdict of guilty, or after a verdict against the defendant on a 
plea of a former conviction or acquittal or once in jeopardy, if the judgment is 
not arrested or a new trial granted, the court must appoint a time for 
pronouncing judgment, which must be at least two days and not more than ten 
days after the verdict. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
While on parole, defendant tested positive for methamphetamine (R. 3). AP&P later 
learned that a warrant had been issued for his arrest (R. 3). Upon being told that he was 
under arrest, defendant fled the AP&P offices (R. 3). AP&P could not locate defendant at 
his last listed address; his roommate reported that he had moved out weeks earlier (id).1 
1
 Factual statements in the foregoing paragraph are taken from the probable cause 
statement. They have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant admitted to 
the facts constituting absconding. 
2 
Defendant was charged by information dated 26 March 1999 with escape, absconding, 
and unlawful consumption of a controlled substance, all third degree felonies (R. 2-4). 
On 10 August 1999 he pled guilty to absconding (R. 76:5). He admitted that while 
on parole he moved without notifying his parole officer (R. 16). The State suggested that the 
court sentence defendant forthwith, inasmuch as defendant was already in prison on another 
offense and the State was recommending that the sentences run concurrently (R. 76: 5-6). 
However, defendant requested a presentence report, and requested further that "it be 
conflicted from AP&P, to either another division outside of Salt Lake County, or to the 
Federal Probation Department" (R. 76:6-7). The court granted defendant's request and set 
sentencing for 17 September (R. 76:7). 
At a 14 September hearing, the court continued sentencing to 29 October on the 
ground that the presentence report was not yet available (R. 23-24). Defense counsel did not 
object (id). At the 29 October hearing, the court continued sentencing until 12 November 
on the ground that defendant had not been transported to court (R. 28-29). Again, defense 
counsel did not object (id). 
However, on 2 November 1999, defendant filed an "Objection to the Imposition of 
Sentence" arguing that the forty-five day sentencing period in rule 22(a), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, had run and was jurisdictional (R. 32-34). The trial court denied 
defendant's objection and sentenced him to zero to five years at Utah State Prison (R. 65:17, 
20). Defendant timely appealed (R. 53-54). 
3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims his sentence for absconding should be waived either because the 
trial court lost jurisdiction by not imposing sentence within rule 22(a)'s time period, or 
because he suffered prejudice and hardship due to the delay. Defendant's first argument fails 
because (1) the court complied with the terms of the rule; and (2) in any event, the 45-day 
time period in rule 22(a) is not jurisdictional. Defendant's second argument fails because he 
suffered no prejudice or hardship due to the delay, and in any event the argument is 
unpreserved and unsupported by the record. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMPLIED WITH RULE 22(a)'S REQUIREMENTS, 
WHICH IN ANY EVENT ARE NOT JURISDICTIONAL 
Defendant does not contest his guilt. Rather, he claims that the trial court, by not 
sentencing him within the time period set out in rule 22(a), lost jurisdiction to sentence him 
at all. Br. Aplt. at 6-11. Because of the court's dilatoriness, defendant contends, he should 
escape punishment for his crime altogether. 
A. The trial court complied with the plain language of rule 22(a). 
Defendant assumes without analysis that the court violated the terms of rule 22(a) in 
this case, and proceeds to examine whether the rule's time constraints are jurisdictional. See 
Br. Aplt. at 6-11. A closer look at the rule demonstrates that the court complied with the 
terms of rule 22(a). Defendant's claim thus trips on this threshold issue. 
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Defendant urges this court to apply the "plain language" of the rule. Br. Aplt. at 6. 
He asserts that the plain language of rule 22(a) "mandates] that sentencing shall be held 
within forty-five days of the plea..." Id. In fact, the plain language of the rule requires only 
that, upon entry of a guilty plea, "the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall 
not be less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. . . ." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) (emphasis 
added). 
This was done here. Upon entry of defendant's guilty plea on 10 August 1999, the 
court "set a time for imposing sentence," 17 September 1999, 'Nvhich [was not] less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea..." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Thus, the court 
complied with rule 22(a). 
After being scheduled within the 45-day period, sentencing was continued twice prior 
to defendant's objection to imposition of sentence. The court continued sentencing until 29 
October 1999 on the ground that the presentence report that defendant had requestedwas not 
yet available (R. 23-24). Although 29 October is more than 45 days after 10 August, defense 
counsel did not object to the continuance (id). At the 29 October hearing the court continued 
sentencing until 12 November 1999 on the ground that defendant had not been transported 
to court (R. 28-29). Again, defense counsel did not object (id). 
Nothing in the plain language of rule 22(a) forbids continuing scheduling dates once 
set within 45 days. However, even if the rule's 45-day period were read to apply to 
5 
continuances, the court still complied. The 45-day period contains an exception. The court 
may, "with the concurrence of the defendant," schedule sentencing more than 45 days after 
entry of the plea. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). Similarly, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-l(5)(a) 
(1999) provides: "Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a 
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report 
from the department or information from other sources about the defendant." 
The continuances here satisfy these provisions. Defendant's concurrence is evident 
from his silence when the court continued scheduling solely to accommodate his request for 
a pre-sentence report. Cf State v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153, 154, 156 (Utah 1989) 
(defendant's right to public trial waived when counsel did not object to court's order). 
Accordingly, the trial court complied with the plain language of rule 22(a) and section 
77-18-l(5)(a). Defendant's claim fails on this ground. 
B. Utah precedent uniformly holds that the time for sentencing is not 
jurisdictional. 
Assuming arguendo that the trial court violated rule 22(a), defendant is nevertheless 
not entitled to evade punishment for his crime. Since defendant did not object to the 
continuance that reset the sentencing date beyond the 45-day period, he is forced to argue that 
the 45-day period is jurisdictional and thus not waivable. Cf. Br. Aplt. at 6 (asserting that 
rule 22(a)'s 45-day period is jurisdictional). 
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History of the rule. Since 1915, Utah's sentencing provision has contained a time 
period.2 From 1915 through 1980, sentencing was governed by UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-1 
and its predecessors. With minor variations, this statute stated: ''After a plea or verdict of 
guilty,... the court must appoint a time for pronouncing judgment, which must be at least 
two days and not more than ten days after the verdict." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-1 (1976). 
In 1980, the section was renumbered and rewritten to expand the ten-day period to 30 
days: "Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set 
a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 30 days after the 
verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. 
. .."§77-35-22(a)(1982). 
In 1990, the Utah criminal rules were moved from title 77, chapter 35 to the current 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 77-35-22(a) became rule 22(a), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. See UTAH CODE ANN. Title 77, chapter 35, Repeals (1999). In 1995, 
the 30-day period was enlarged to 45 days. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22, note (1995). 
Utah case law. In numerous decisions interpreting section 77-35-1, the Utah 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that the sentencing period was jurisdictional. Seey e.g., 
Kelbach v. McCotter, 872 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Utah 1994); State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 797 
2
 Prior to 1915, the sentencing statute contained no fixed outside time limit. See R. 
S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 4905 ("After a plea or verdict of guilty, . . . the court must 
appoint a time for pronouncing judgment, which must be at least two days after the 
verdict, if the court intends to remain in session so long; or if not, as remote a time as can 
reasonably be allowed"). 
7 
(Utah 1977); State v. Fedder, 1 Utah 2d 117, 120, 262 P.2d 753, 754-55 (Utah 1953); State 
v. LeeLim, 7 P.2d 825, 826 (Utah 1932); and Rose v. District Court, 67 Utah 526, 248 P. 
486, 488 (Utah 1926). 
In Kelbach, the supreme court stated, "As our opinion in State v. Fedder makes clear, 
the time fixed by section 77-35-1 is not jurisdictional. Instead, those time limits are 'merely 
directory.'" Kelbach, 872 P.2d at 1035 (citation omitted). 
In Fedder, the supreme court stated, "This court has held that the time fixed by the 
statute is not jurisdictional, Rose v. District Court, 67 Utah 526, 248 P.2d 486, and since it 
is regarded as merely directory the further provision that the judgment should be rendered 
within a reasonable time has been judicially read into the statute." Fedder, 1 Utah 2d at 120, 
262 P.2d at 754-55 (citation omitted). 
In Rose, after noting that the defendant did not object to his untimely sentence, the 
supreme court held "that the trial court . . . was not without jurisdiction to pronounce 
judgment on the date judgment was pronounced." Rose, 248 P. at 488. Although the court 
mentioned Rose's waiver, it could not have been dispositive, since subject matter 
"jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent" Devlin v. District Court of Weber County, 53 
Utah 208, 178 P. 73, 74 (Utah 1919). 
In Lee Lim, the supreme court stated, "There is nothing in the statute, however, to 
indicate that the Legislature intended that the court should lose jurisdiction of the cause and 
that a convicted defendant should be entirely relieved of the punishment provided by law, if 
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by accident mistake, or design the court failed within ten days to impose a valid sentence 
. . . " Lee Lim, 1 P.2d at 827-28. "We think no one would so contend." Id. at 828. In fact, 
the court observed, "It shocks one's conception of good sense and justice to say that a person 
who has been lawfully convicted of a crime should be relieved from serving the sentence 
provided by law because the court erred in pronouncing sentence." Id. at 827. 
In Helm, the supreme court stated, "There can be no doubt about the desirability of 
compliance with that statute. But to argue that the court loses jurisdiction entirely is quite 
another matter." Helm, 563 P.2d at 797. "It requires no exposition thereon to demonstrate 
what egregious injustices might result because of some inadvertence, error or omission if 
such were the case, especially so in cases where serious crimes may have been committed." 
Id. Accordingly, the court concluded, "the limits so prescribed in the statute are not 
mandatory and jurisdictional, but are directory; and that where the sentence is imposed within 
a reasonable time so that there is no abuse of the court's powers nor adverse effects upon the 
defendant, he should not be entitled to go free." Id. 
State v. Helm. Defendant cites but does not discuss Kelbach, Fedder, and Rose. 
See Br. Aplt. at 8. He attempts to distinguish Helm's holding that the sentencing time is not 
jurisdictional on a number of grounds. None is persuasive. 
First, defendant argues that "the holdings relate to a former statute, not the current rule 
. . . " Br. Aplt. at 8. This assertion is inconsequential. This Court has already relied on a 
judicial construction of section 77-35-22 in interpreting rule 22. See State v. Scheel 823 
9 
P.2d 470, 474 n. 5 (Utah App. 1991). Moreover, Utah and other courts frequently rely on 
judicial interpretations of predecessor statutes in construing their current counterparts, see, 
e.g., Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 801 P.2d 912, 915, 18 Media Law Rep. 1831 (Utah 
1990); Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, 957 (Utah App. 
1993); although such interpretations are not necessarily controlling, see, e.g., McGoldrick v. 
Walker, 838 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1992). 
Obviously, rule 22(a) differs from section 77-35-1 in certain respects. However, the 
policy driving the supreme court's construction of the statute—that a guilty defendant should 
not escape punishment due to a reasonable delay, especially where any delay was at his 
request or for his benefit—applies equally to the current rule. 
Defendant also argues that "the current rule differs from the former statute in that it 
creates a significantly longer period for sentencing—forty-five days as opposed to ten 
days—thereby allotting trial courts an abundant amount of time in which to meet the 
mandates of the rule . . ." Br. Aplt. at 8. This argument relies on the assumption that the 
longer a time period, the more reason to rule it jurisdictional. This assumption is incorrect. 
For example, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-l-302(l)(a) (1999) requires that a prosecution 
for a felony or negligent homicide "shall be commenced within four years after it is 
committed." Yet this Court has held that this four-year statute is not jurisdictional. See 
James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 573 (Utah App. 1998), cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1999). Whether a time period is jurisdictional is thus not a function of its length. 
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Defendant further contends that "in adopting the current rule, the Supreme Court 
remedied the second concern outlined in Helm, by explicitly allowing the period to be 
extended at the request or with the consent of defendant." Id. (citation omitted). In other 
words, a jurisdictional time limit without exceptions would be draconian; the current rule, 
containing a safety valve on its time limit, may be read as jurisdictional. 
On the contrary, a provision allowing a defendant to waive the rule' s requirement and 
extend the period for an unspecified time militates against reading the rule as jurisdictional. 
This is so because "subject matter jurisdiction cannot be created or conferred upon the court 
by consent or waiver." Transworld Systems, Inc. v. Robison, 796 P.2d 407,409 (Utah App. 
1990). 
Moreover, defendant's argument misreads Helm. Helm did not state or imply that the 
sentencing time frame could not be jurisdictional because it was inflexible. Rather, its 
reasoning was based on the inequity of permitting a defendant to take advantage of a delay 
ordered for his benefit: '"where there is a reasonable extension of time for sentencing, made 
either at the defendant's request, or with his consent, or where it appears that it was 
calculated to be for his possible benefit in determining whether he should be placed on 
probation,... the failure of the court to impose sentence within the statutory time should not 
be grounds for the defendant's release . . . " Id. 
Applying this principle to the case at bar, rule 22(a) should not be ruled jurisdictional 
where the 45-day period was exceeded at defendant's request, or with his consent, or for his 
11 
possible benefit in determining whether he should be placed on probation. Here, the State 
suggested that defendant be sentenced at the change of plea hearing; defendant requested a 
presentence report prepared by an agency other than Salt Lake County AP&P (R. 76: 5-7). 
Because the report had not been completed within the 45-day period, the court, without 
objection from defendant, continued sentencing (R. 23-24). Thus, the 45-day period was 
exceeded with defendant's consent and for his possible benefit in determining whether he 
should be placed on probation. Helm's reasoning thus dictates that the time period is not 
jurisdictional here. 
Lastly, defendant argues that by lengthening the time period and "substitut[ing] the 
word 'shall' for 'must' when it adopted Rule 22(a)" the supreme court intended to make the 
rule's longer time period jurisdictional. Br. Aplt. at 9; compare § 77-35-1 ('the court must 
appoint a time for pronouncing judgment, which must be at least two days and not more than 
ten days after the verdict") with Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) ("the court shall set a time for 
imposing sentence which shall not be less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict"). 
This argument fails for two reasons. First, the legislature, not the supreme court, 
changed the word must to shall and lengthened the period from 10 to 30 days. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-35-22(a) (Supp. 1980) ("the court shall set a time for imposing sentence 
which shall be not less than two nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea"). These 
changes thus offer no clue to the court's intentions. 
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Second, shall is weaker, not stronger, than must. It is difficult to see how any 
requirement could be strengthened by changing must to any other word, especially 
one—shall—whose most common definition is 'to indicate simple futurity." THE AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1125 (2nd college ed. 1991). Accordingly, given the supreme court's 
unbroken 74-year history of interpreting the term must in this context as directory and non-
jurisdictional, this Court should have no difficulty in interpreting the weaker word shall in 
the same manner here. 
State v. Price. Rather than interpreting rule 22(a) in light of Kelbach, Helm, Fedder, 
Lee Lim, and Rose, this Court should, defendant argues, look to State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 
582 (Utah App. 1992). See Br. Aplt. at 10. 
Price interprets UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1990), under which a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea must be filed within 30 days of entry of the plea. Price held this 
provision was jurisdictional, like the 30-day periods for filing a notice of appeal and a 
petition for a writ of certiorari. 837 P.2d at 582-83. 
Price is inapposite here. Defendant reasons that this Court should follow Price 
because the language of section 77-13-6(2)(b) is similar to the language of Utah R. Crim. P. 
22(a). See Br. Aplt. at 10. Both do contain the word shall. However, this coincidence of a 
single word does not control. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-l-302(l)(a)'s requirement that a 
prosecution for a felony "shall be commenced within four years after it is committedf,]" 
13 
despite the word shall, is not jurisdictional. See James, 965 P.2d at 573. The James court 
mentioned, but did not discuss, Price. See id. at 572 n.3. 
Just as Price offered no guidance in construing that statute of limitations, it offers no 
guidance in construing this sentencing provision. The policies and interests involved in 
entertaining a motion to withdraw a guilty plea are unlike those involved in scheduling a 
sentencing hearing. Our supreme court cases interpreting rule 22(a)'s predecessor statute 
spell out the relevant policies and provide the surer guide to this Court. 
C. Defendant's claim of prejudice is unpreserved and lacks record 
support. 
Citing Helm, defendant claims that his "sentence must be vacated under the 
circumstances of this case where the delay resulted in the imposition of hardship and 
prejudice on defendant." Br. Aplt. at 10. This argument fails for at least three reasons. 
First, it is unpreserved. To advance an argument on appeal, a litigant must lodge an 
objection "specific enough to give the trial court notice of the very error... complained of." 
Tolmanv. Winchester Hills WaterCo., 912 P.2d457,460 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting Beehive 
Medical Elec.f Inc. v. Square D Co., 669 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983)). Here, defendant did 
not make, and does not claim to have made, the argument he now asserts on appeal. In fact, 
he argued quite a contrary proposition—that the court's decision, whatever it was, would 
have little effect on him, since he was "incarcerated and will likely remain so for quite awhile 
at the Utah State Prison" (R. 65:13). 
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Second, defendant's argument lacks record support. An appellate court's "review is 
of course limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal." Wilderness Building 
Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985). Here, the "hardship and 
prejudice" defendant claims is that "the delay in sentencing postponed the date at which he 
would appear before the Board to determine the actual time he would serve" on his prior 
conviction. Br. Aplt. at 10-11. Defendant does not claim or cite any record support for this 
allegation of counsel. 
Finally, delay in scheduling defendant's first appearance before the Board of Pardons 
is not "hardship." 
D. Reading rule 22(a)'s time period as jurisdictional would grant 
defendant a windfall. 
The result defendant urges here would be one of the "egregious injustices" warned 
against in Helm. 563 P.2d at 797. He seeks to be "entirely relieved of the punishment 
provided by law," Lee Limt 7 P.2d at 827-28, based on delays prompted by his own request 
for a presentence report and continuances ordered for his benefit and to which he did not 
object. Lee Lim 's dictum seems apropos: "It shocks one's conception of good sense and 
justice to say that a person who has been lawfully convicted of a crime should be relieved 
from serving the sentence provided by law because the court erred in pronouncing sentence." 
Id. at 827. 
Defendant's trial counsel realized that the effect of his motion was, in his words, "to 
ambush the Court" (R. 65:11). He thus attempted to assure the court that he had not set the 
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trap: "I, as Counsel, was not present when the plea was entered. So, 1 don't want the Court 
to think that I'm trying to ambush the Court as Counsel" (R. 65:11). He continued, "But I 
want to make it clear to the Court that I wasn't setting this up from the beginning. I didn't 
have anything to do with the entry of the plea. I didn't advise anybody, 'Don't waive your 
time. We'll try to ambush them down the road'" (R. 65:12). 
Nevertheless, whether this particular attorney was "setting this up from the beginning" 
or not, the result the same, and is unjust. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm defendant's sentence. 
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